组织行为学09OrganizationalAlliances

Ch9OrganizationalAlliances06.08.02.doc06.08.02Chapter9.OrganizationalAlliances,Partnerships,andNetworks1ByKathrynA.BakerAlthoughtheliteratureonorganizationalalliancesandnetworksfocusesprimarilyonprivatesectororganizations,publicsectororganizationshavelongconfrontedpressurestomanagetheirenvironmentsthroughtheformationofalliances.Moreover,severalorganizationaltheoristshavepositedthatprivateandpublicsectoralliancesarebecomingmoreprevalent,particularlyintherealmofresearchanddevelopment(EisenhardtandSchoonhoven1996;Freeman1991;Hagedoorn1995).Public/privatescienceandtechnologypartnershipscanhelpfocusnewresearchinitiativestowardaddressingcollectiveandpublicissues,suchashealth,nationalsecurity,andenvironmentalprotection.Thesepartnershipsalsopromotepublicandprivatecostsharingtoachievesciencegoalsandobjectives.Finally,sciencepartnershipscouldencouragemoreefficientandeffectivescience,reducingredundancies,eliminatingexcessiveand/orunproductivecompetition,andencouragingsynergyandcooperationwhereneeded.Inaddition,publicsciencepolicywillhavetoaddresswhen,where,andhowtopromotescientificpartnershipswithdevelopingcountriesand/orotherinternationalorglobalscientificalliances/partnerships.TheoreticalBackgroundOverahalfcenturyago,Coase(1937)suggestedthatfirmsandmarketsrepresentalternativemeansoforganizingbusinesstransactions–aninsightthatwaslargelyignoreduntilWilliamson(1975;1985)elaborateditssignificancealmostfourdecadeslater.Williamsonpresentedaconceptualframeworkthatcontrastedthemarketandthehierarchicalfirmasthetwomaintransactionmodes.Heplacedlittleemphasisontransactionmodesthatfellinbetweenthesetwopoles.Thismarket/hierarchicalfirmdichotomydominatedsubsequentorganizationalthinking.Williamson’scoreargument(1985:83)wasthattechnicaltransactionswilloccurasmarketexchangeswhentheyarestraightforward,non-repetitive,anddonotrequiretransaction-specificinvestments;technicaltransactionswilloccurwithinhierarchicallygovernedfirmswhentheyinvolveuncertaintyabouttheiroutcome,recurfrequently,andrequiresubstantial“transaction-specificinvestments”ofmoney,time,orenergy(meaningthattheyarenoteasilytransferable).Williamsonequatedfirmswithhierarchies,assumingthatallfirmshavehierarchicalgovernancestructures.Hierarchicalfirmsbasicallycomeintoexistencebecause(1)itisdifficulttospecifyclearcontractualrights,obligations,andperformanceexpectationsforuncertain,repetitive,andasset-specifictransactions;and(2)thesetypesoftransactionsrequirestrictmonitoringandcontroltopreventtheopportunismthatcouldariseintheabsenceofstronghierarchicalauthorityrelations.Eventhoughthereareinefficienciesassociatedwithhierarchical,bureaucraticorganizations,organizationspreferthesedisadvantagestotherelativelygreatercostsandrisksthatwouldoccurifthetransactionswereconductedasmarketexchanges.Morerecentscholarshavechallengedthismarket/hierarchydichotomy.Thesechallengeshavebeenleveledontwofronts.First,thehistoricalaccuracyofthecharacterizationhasbeenattacked.Somearguethatmarkets,inthemodernsenseoftheterm,didnotexistuntilthelatter1Relatedchaptersinclude:SciencePolicy;Strategy;ChangeManagement;KnowledgeManagement;Teams,Projects,andPrograms;OrganizationalCommunication.Ch9OrganizationalAlliances06.08.02.doc206.08.02partoftheeighteenthcentury.Earlymarkets,suchasthoseinmedievalEngland,weresteepedinpersonal,hierarchical,andsymbolicunderpinnings.Evenaftertheriseofthemodernmarket,craft-basedfirmsinnorthernItalyandindustriesinsouthwesternGermanycontinuedtobecharacterizedbydiversified,inter-firmlinkagesofsuppliers,assemblers,andendusers(Brusco1982;Finley1973;Herrigel1990;Sabel1989),andJapanesebusinessgroupsevennowcontinuetorelyonextensiveandflexiblepartnershipsthatpromotejointlearningandsharedresponsibilityfortechnologicalinnovation(Aoki1990;Dore1987;Fruin1992;Sako1992).Thehistoryofeconomicactivity,whethertoldbyBraudel(1982),Polanyi(1957),Thompson(1971),orWallerstein(1974),isthusastoryofenterprisescharacterizedbylooseandhighlypermeableboundaries,incontrasttofirm/marketdichotomies(Powell1990).Second,andmostimportantly,thereisgrowingrecognitionthatcontemporaryfirmsareincreasinglyblurringtheirboundariesbyengaginginformsofcollaborationthatresembleneitherthefamiliar“arm’slength”contractingarrangementofmarketexchangesnortheidealhierarchicalintegrationofthefirm(Powell1990).Theyaremovingbeyondhierarchicalcommandandcontrolgovernancestructuresanddevelopingorganizationalcontextsandsupportstructurestofacilitateinternalandexternalexchangesandon-goingrelationships.Theupsurgeinnon-hierarchicalorganizationalformschallengesnotonlytheaccuracyofthemarket/hierarchydichotomy,butalsothepowerofthischaracterizationasanexplanatorydevice.Ratherthantreatingnon-hierarchicalorganizationalformsashybrids(Williamson1991),theoristsnowseethemasdistinctorganizationaltypesthatrequireanewexplanatoryframeworks.Severallabelshavebeenusedtodescribetheseorganizationalforms,suchasvirtual(ChesbroughandTeece1996;DavidowandMalone1992),network(Powell1990),orflexiblespecialization(PioreandSabel1984).Whateverthelabel,theseemergingorganizationsarea