股权激励外文文献【中英对照】

外文文献原文TheDiffusionofEquityIncentivePlansinItalianListedCompanies1.INTRODUCTIONPaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo-Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations(e.g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;CheffinsandThomas,2004;Zattoni,2007).IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remunerationencompassesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort-termpayhasbecomemoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown.Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong-termcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong-termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptplansinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;2005).Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentiveplansseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarketorienteddrivers,suchastheevolvingshareownershippatternsortheinternationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw-orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(CheffinsandThomas,2004).Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,”characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e.g.,Cheffins,2003;CheffinsandThomas,2004).Ironically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentiveplans(CheffinsandThomas,2004).CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages.The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank-and-fileworkers.Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhasbecomeahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Stockoptionplanshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal.,2002;BebchukandFried,2006).Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentiveplans,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingplansoutsidetheUSandtheUK.ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesanalyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentiveplansintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandgovernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries.Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.Ourgoalistocomparetheexplanatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentiveplans:1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal.,2002);and3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatesthatcompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costadvantages.Tothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanssincetheendofthe’90s.Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i.e.,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentiveplansadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of-meansstatisticaltechniquestoanalyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat:1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;2)theseplansarenotextensivelyusedtoextractcompanyvalue,althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;and3)plans’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentoftheliteratureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewgovernancepractices.Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentiveplanshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextractcompanyvalueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequit